. Based on the (t, n) threshold cryptography, this paper introduced mobile agents to exchange private key and network topological information with nodes in the network. This method avoids a centralized certification authority to distribute the public keys and the certificates, thus enhances security. Carrying private key and some state variables, mobile agents navigate in the network according to visitsbalance policy, namely, node with the least visits would be first visited by mobile agent. Any t nodes in the network can cooperate to perform an authentication upon a new node wanting to join the network. Experimental results show that the mobile agent performs very well for improving the success ratio of authentication and enhance security while reducing the communication overhead and resource consumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ad Hoc network solving problems in real world increasingly attracts attention from industrial and academic fields [1] . Using a wireless radio communication channel, the main advantage of Ad Hoc network is low cost of deployment and maintenance, since the nodes and wireless hardware are inexpensive and easily available. Military tactical operations are still the main application of today's ad hoc networks. However, Ad hoc network can also be used for emergency, law enforcement, and rescue missions. It becomes an attractive option for commercial uses such as sensor networks or virtual classrooms.
Most previous researches about Ad Hoc network focus on problems such as routing and communication in a reliable environment. However, many applications are made in unreliable environments. Securing wireless ad hoc networks is particularly difficult for many reasons as follows: (a) The vulnerability of channels. Wireless networks are susceptible to be attacked ranging from passive eavesdropping, message replay, and message distortion, to active attack by destroy communication in ad hoc network; (b) The vulnerability of nodes. Since network nodes usually communicated in open area, they can more easily be captured and attacked by an attacker; (c) The absence of an infrastructure. Ad hoc networks operate normally with infrastructureless. This makes the classical security solutions in wire network based on centralized sever and trust environment inapplicable; (d) Dynamical changing topology. In mobile ad hoc networks, networks nodes are free to join or leave in any group of network node. Therefore, Ad Hoc network is vulnerable to attacks: an attacker can easily inject false packets and simulate another sender; an attacker can also eavesdrop on communication, record packets, and replay these packets potentially altered. Key management is an important technique for security of Ad Hoc network which is hot but difficult.
It's a novel way to deal with the key management based on mobile agent. Mobile agent is a program segment which is self-controlling. They navigate from node to node not only transmitting data but also doing computation. They are an effective paradigm for distributed applications, and especially attractive in a dynamic network environment [2] . This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the related work. In Section 3, our routing algorithm is introduced. In Section 4, we put forward the new key management and authentication method. Section 5 gives discussion. Experiment is shown in Section 6 and we conclude in Section 7.
II. RELATED WORK
A wireless ad hoc network or a mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a network where a set of mobile devices communicate among themselves using wireless transmission without the support of fixed or stationary infrastructure. Due to its infrastructure-less nature, an ad hoc network can be deployed very fast at a relatively low cost enabling communication when it is not possible or too expensive to deploy a support infrastructure. A wide range of military and commercial applications have been proposed for ad hoc networks. But a large portion of research in ad hoc networks has focused on routing, medium access control and power management and only recently researchers have started looking at security issues in ad hoc networks.
Public key cryptography has been recognized as one of the most effective mechanisms for providing fundamental security services including authentication, digital signatures and encryption. The effective management of digital certificates is a key factor for the successful widespread deployment of public key cryptography. PKI (Public Key Infrastructure), an infrastructure for managing digital certificates, was introduced exactly for this purpose. The most important component of PKI is the CA (Certificate Authority), the trusted entity in the system that vouches for the validity of digital certificates. The success of PKI depends on the security and availability of the CA to the principals in a system (or the nodes in a network) since a principal must be able to correspond with the CA to get a certificate, check the status of another principal's certificate, acquire another principal's certificate, and so on. PKI has been deployed for wired networks and some infrastructure-based wireless networks. Since good connectivity can be assumed in these networks, the main thrust of research in such environments has focused on the security of the CA and the scalability of the CA to handle a large number of requests.
However, it is unclear if PKI solutions can be extended to ad hoc networks [3] . On the contrary, maintaining connectivity is one of the main challenges, since the inherent infrastructure-less nature of ad hoc networks inhibits guaranteeing any kind of connectivity. Another serious problem present in ad hoc networks is the increased physical vulnerability of the nodes themselves. Considering that many ad hoc networks will be deployed with mobile nodes, the possibility of the nodes being captured or compromised in a hostile environment is higher than in wired networks with stationary hosts. Mobile nodes in infrastructure-based wireless networks have the same vulnerability, but they can rely on the infrastructure for detection of compromised nodes, help with recovery and storage of sensitive information. Since there is no stable entity in an ad hoc network, ad hoc nodes cannot enjoy such conveniences.
L. Zhou and Z. J. Haas [4] first introduced a key management system for Ad Hoc network based on threshold cryptography. In their solution, a group of n servers together with a master public-private key pair are deployed by CA. Each server has a share of the master private key and stores key pair of all nodes. The share of master private key is generated by threshold cryptography. Thus, only n servers together can form a whole signature. For any node wanting to join the network, it must collect all the n partial signatures and thus compute the whole signature locally to get the certificate.
Kong and others [5] address availability by making all M nodes in the network share CA functionality. A client need only contact k out of M nodes to get a certification service. Assuming there are k nodes in a client's one hop neighborhood, the client can get a certification service cheaply by using a one-hop broadcast for the request. While this solution addresses availability and fault tolerance, it compromises the security of the system. In general, the gap between k and n in secret sharing schemes defines the security of the system. k can be chosen between 1 and n in any secret sharing scheme. As k approaches n, thus closing the gap between k and n, the system becomes more secure because an adversary needs to compromise at least k nodes to collapse the system. But if k is too large, the system becomes less available to clients and also less tolerant to faults. When k approaches 1, making the gap larger, the effect is reversed and the system becomes more available but also less secure. Kong chose to keep k relatively small to address the availability problem and ended up with a vulnerable system where any adversary need only compromise a small number of nodes in the network to collapse the service.
Another notable scheme is proposed by Hubaux and others [6] . In their scheme, there is no concept of a CA. Every node acts as its own CA, similar to the PGP "Web of Trust" model. The main difference between PGP and their scheme is that there is no longer a well-known certificate directory where all certificates are stored. Rather, every user in the system carries a part of the certificate directory. In PGP, when two users wish to authenticate each other, they must search the certificate directory for a chain of certificates that links both users. In Hubuax's scheme, this problem is transformed into finding an intersecting point between the certificate chains carried by each user. Hubaux proposed a shortcuthunter algorithm for this problem. While their approach is practical for the totally self organizing networks they aimed at, it has the inherent problem of no definite trust anchor like the CA in other CA-based PKI approaches.
We identify two main challenges in distributing the CA functionality over multiple nodes. The first challenge is picking a set of nodes to collectively provide the CA service. The second and equally important challenge is how to provide efficient and effective communication between the mobile nodes and the CA nodes, even in dynamic networks with possible compromises or temporary network partitions.
We use mobile agents. Mobile agent is a program segment which is self-controlling. They navigate from node to node not only transmitting data but also doing computation. Carrying secret key and network state information, each mobile agent navigates in the network and updates its data with recent information gathered from other agents or nodes. The t shares of private key can be collected quickly, so the authentication can be completed effectively. For example, if the transmission range is 300 meters, the average velocity is 10m/sec, and the current distance between i and j is 100 meters, the survival time of connection between i and j (worst-case) is 20 seconds, assuming that node i navigates away from j in the straight-line direction between them.
III. ROUTING ALGORITHM

A. Relevant Terms
(2) Counter Each node in the network maintains a counter which is initialized to 0 when the network commences. Agents navigate form one node to another, collecting and distributing information. When an agent has completed its tasks and is about to leave a node, it adds 1 to the node's counter and stores the new value against the node's ID in its data structure. Obviously, the value of node's counter represents the visits of the node visited by agents since the commencement of the network. It also implies that if two agents have a set of data concerning the same nodes, say node i, the agent carrying the bigger counter of node i has more recent information about i. Table 1 . 
B. Agent Navigation Algorithm
The primary goal of agent is to deliver information of one node to others in the network (including their link state). In order to achieve this goal with the least overload, we put forward a least-visited-neighbor-first algorithm to control the navigation of mobile agent. An agent applies the algorithm to the information of its host node on which it currently resides, and decides its next destination. The next destination is always a neighbor of the host node. Each agent navigates on its path, updating its briefcase with recent information gathered from other agents or nodes. Each node has a information cache that agents can update with more recent values. Nodes access this shared cache whenever they require information about the network.
To reach node i, an agent program P performs the following steps，as shown in Figure 1 . Step1: Update the information cache of node i with any newer information available in its own briefcase. The counter of all nodes stored in the information cache of node i is compared with the corresponding counter carried in the briefcase of this agent. If the counter of some nodes, say j, in the host node's information cache happens to be less than that in the agent's briefcase, obviously, the agent is carrying more recent information about node j. In that case, the entire information about node j in the host node's cache is overwritten by information in the agent's briefcase.
Step2: Determine which neighboring node has the least counter. It is the least visited neighbor.
Step3: If this neighbor of i hasn't been visited in recent 3 times, the agent selects this neighbor as its next destination. History information about the last 3 visits can be found in the node's information cache. In case node selected has been visited in the recent past, the agent selects the second least-visited neighbor, and so on. This ensures that several agents from the same host node will not choose the same destination consecutively.
Step4: After choosing the next destination, the agent updates its next destination's ID with the chosen destination node ID, and changes the history variables in the host node's information cache with the next destination node.
Step5: Add 1 to the host node's counter and stores this value against the host node's ID in the agent's briefcase. Step6: When an agent is ready to navigate, it copies the entire content of the host node's information cache into its briefcase.
Step7: The agent resumes navigating.
IV. KEY MANAGEMENT AND AUTHENTICATION
A. Identity-based Encryption
The idea of identity-based cryptosystem is proposed with the original motivation of simplifying certificate management in E-mail system. The basic idea is to find an approach, in which each entity's public key can be defined by an arbitrary string. In other words, users may use some well-known information, such as e-email address, IP address, or identity as their public key. Thus there is no need to propagate this common information through the network.
There are four algorithms in identity-based encryption scheme: Setup, Extract, Encrypt and Decrypt.
-Setup: Generates the master public/private key pair and common system parameters.
-Extract: Given an arbitrary string as public key, generates the corresponding private key.
-Encrypt: Takes a message and encrypts it using the public key.
-Decrypt: Decrypts a message using the corresponding private key.
With identity-based encryption, all the private keys are generated by a trusted authority, called private key generator (PKG). The PKG holds a master secret, which is used to compute the private key. That is, without knowledge of the master secret, no private key can be computed. Similar to other centralized schemes, the PKG in identity-based cryptosystem is sensitive to the exposure of the master secret, and can not satisfy the requirement of distributed key management in wireless ad hoc networks. To address this problem, we use threshold secret sharing to distribute the PKG service and enhance the fault-tolerance of the network.
B. Threshold Secret Sharing
Secret sharing allows a secret to be shared among a group of users (also called shareholders) in such a way that no single user can deduce the secret from his share alone. To construct the secret, one needs to combine a sufficient number of shares. In the (t, n) threshold secret sharing, the secret is distributed to n shareholders, and any t out of these n shareholders can reconstruct the secret, but any collection of less than t partial shares can not get any information about the secret. Here, t is the threshold parameter such that 1≤ t≤ n .
Definition: 1≤t≤n，P={p 1 ,p 2 ,...,p n } is an aggregate of n numbers. X is a subset of P. X={p 1 ,p 2 
through the safe channel.
② Private key reconstruction phase
Step1: Any t numbers of P (assume
announce their secret key (x i ,y i );
Step2: Use Lagrange formula to calculate
C. Authentication steps
We assume that each mobile node carries an IP address or an identity, which is unique and unchanged during its lifetime in the ad hoc network. The address is selected without any conflict with other nodes in the network. We also assume that each mobile node has a routing cache to save the topology information.
Our proposed approach comprises of two components: distributed key generation and identity based authentication. The key generation component provides master key, the public/private key pair to each node of the ad hoc network in a distribute way. The generated private keys are used for authentication. Identity-based authentication mechanism provides end-to-end authentication and confidentiality between the communication nodes. If the authentication process succeeds, the communication nodes exchange a session key, which can be used for future communication.
Consider an ad hoc network with n nodes in the initial phase. The network has a public/private key pair, called master key <PK, SK>, which is used to provide key generation service to all the nodes in the network. The master public key pair is generated by the key generation component, in such a manner that the master PK is well known to all the nodes in the network, and the master private key SK is shared by all of them in a (t, n) threshold fashion. Each of them holds a unique secret share of the master private key SK, and no one is able to reconstruct the master private key based on its own information. Any t nodes among them can reconstruct the mater private key jointly, whereas it is infeasible for at most t-1 nodes to do so, even by collusion. Each node within the network needs to obtain its personal private key corresponding to its identity and register to the network before utilizing any network service. The way to obtain the personal private key is to request private key generation (PKG) service from at least k neighbor nodes.
In the following Sections, we describe the basic operations of our proposed key management approach: master public/private key generation, distribute private key generation service, new master private key share creation, authentication, new node creation, and secret key revocation.
(1) Master Key Generation Our distributed key generation mechanism is different from the basic (t, n) threshold secret sharing scheme in that it does not need the support of the trusted third party to safely compute a master key, separate it into multiple pieces and then distribute the shares to shareholders. Instead, the master key pair is computed collaboratively by the initial network nodes without constructing the master private key at any single node.
Each node Ci randomly chooses a secret x i and a polynomial f i (z) of degree t-1, such that f i (0)= x i . Node Ci computes his sub-share for node Cj as ss ij = fi (j) for j = 1,2...n and sends s ij securely to Cj. After sending the n-1 sub-shares, node Cj can computes its master private key share as S j = ∑ = shared, each shareholder publishes SiP, where P is a common parameter used by the identity-based scheme [11] . Then the master public key can be computed as
.
(2) Distributed Private Key Generation
Using the identity-based cryptography, a mobile node's public key can be any arbitrary string. The public key can be computed as Q ID H(ID ||Expire_time) , where H() stands for an hash function defined in identity-based encryption [10] , ID represents the identity of the node, and Expire_time is a time stamp protecting from the private key loss. When the public-key gets expired, the node needs to obtain its new public key and corresponding private key.
To utilize the network service and decrypt the message encrypted using its public key Q ID from other nodes, the node also needs to obtain its corresponding private key. The way to obtain the private key is to contact at least t neighbor nodes, present the identity and request private key generation (PKG) service. The node that holds the master key share can be the PKG service node. In our scheme, all the network nodes share the master private key, thus each of them can be the PKG service node. Each of the t PKG service nodes generates a secret share of a new private key sk and sends to the requesting node. To make sure the generated shares are securely transmitted, the requesting node may also present its selfgenerated temporary public key when sending request. Each of the PKG service nodes sends encrypted share to the requesting node using the requesting node's temporary public key pk-temp. The process of generation of a share of the new secret key sk can be represented by function ski = SiQ ID ,where Si (i=1,…, t) is the share of the master private key of the serving node, ID is the identity of the requesting node, Q ID is its public key, and ski denotes the generated private key share for the requesting node.
Since we would like to make this public key information well-known to the whole network, we also define the public key as the requesting node's network identifier (NID). There are many mobile agents which navigate in the network. The mobile agents can carry the secret pair (x i ,y i ) of nodes. By collecting the t shares of its new private key, the requesting node would compute its new private key sk ＝ .After this key generation process, the requesting node obtains its new private key sk and all other nodes would register the requesting node into their registration table by entering the node's NID. It is easy to see that an adversary cannot duplicate the existing identity in the network given the assumptions that the node's identity is identical. In summary, any t nodes with the shares of master private key can perform the PKG service for other nodes in a t out of n threshold fashion such that the adversary who corrupts less than t nodes cannot learn the node's private key. During the distributed key generation phase, each node within the network obtains its public/private key pair, and also registers its NID. It discards its temporary public/private key pair, and keeps the new key pair in its memory for the later authentication and communication. We note that the PKG only issues the keys once for a particular node, so that an adversary cannot duplicate the existing identity in the network.
(3) New node Creation
When a new node joins a network, it presents its identity, self-generated temporary public key to t neighbor nodes and requests PKG service, the master public key and his share of the master private key. Each node in the coalition verifies the validity of the identity of the new node Cp. If the verification process succeeds, the private key can be generated. To initialize the share of master key for the requesting node, each coalition node Ci generates the partial share s ip = Si ⋅ li (p) for node Cp. Here, li (p) is the Lagrange term. It encrypts the partial share using the temporary public key of requesting node and ends it to node Cp. Node Cp obtains its new share by adding the partial shares as
After obtaining the share of the master private key, the new joining node is available to provide PKG service to other joining nodes. The new node could be permitted into the network. A new line and row will be added into the matrix of cache in each node.
(4) Identity Authentication
All the keys generated in the previous phase are used for authentication. Suppose source node S wants to send node D an authenticated message, such that only node D can decrypt. Moreover, the node D can make sure that the message is really from the source node S. Source node S simply can simply signs the message using its private key, encrypts using the destination node's identity and sends it to the destination node. When the destination node receives this encrypted message, it decrypts it first using its private key, and then using the source node's public key. If the verification process succeeds, the destination node accepts this packet as a valid message. The authentication process is a sign and encryption procedure, in which digital signature is used for the authentication of messages and encryption is used for the confidentiality of messages. Monitor the neighboring node. For example, if the neighboring node never retransmits data packets or agents, it may be a black hole, and it should be excluded from the network. The secret key of this node should be revoked. All other nodes delete the corresponding line and row from their information cache matrix.
V. DISCUSSION
The node's information matrix can be acquired through mobile agent routing algorithm and the data packets can be transmitted by the routing algorithm. The routing algorithm is a breadth-first search algorithm. The destination node is the root of the tree. A jump is a layer of the tree. The maximum number of layers is the number of nodes in the network.
Communicating with node j, node i performs as follows:
Step1: Examine a ij of i's matrix. If a ij is not equal to 0, there is a connection between i and j. The data packets are sent to j directly. End routing. Otherwise, data packets can not be transmitted to j directly. Go to step2.
Step2: Examine line j a of i's cache matrix. Select items which are not equal to 0. These items are child node of j. If all items in a j are equal to 0, there is no path available between i and j. End routing. Otherwise, go to step3.
Step3: Continue searching their child nodes according to its corresponding line. If child nodes do not contain i, delete these routings. Otherwise, add each value of the routing to get the sum. The biggest one is the first-select routing, and the second is spare. The rest may be deduced. Record all the routings, end routing.
Step4: If all child nodes don't contain i, continue searching their child nodes according to corresponding line and judge whether child-child nodes contain i. If node i is found less than n (number of nodes) times, end routing. Otherwise, the routing is not existed. Node i can not communicate with node j. End routing. Carrying the secret key, agents navigate in the network. At the same time, the data packets can be transmitted according to the global matrix of each node and the data routing algorithm.
VI. EXPERIMENT
We use NS2 [12] simulator to evaluate the performance. The simulation region is a bounded area of 1000*1000 square meters. The radio range, sending capacity and MAC have been chosen to represent an off-the-shelf device. The speed is uniformly distributed between 1 and 5 m/s. The simulation time is chosen to be long enough (900s) to potentially roam the whole area. Nodes are initially placed randomly in this region. The mobility model chosen is the Random Waypoint Model. Each node navigates linearly towards their chosen destination. After reaching, they optionally wait for a random time and choose a new destination to navigate. CBR has been chosen for traffic to avoid protocol particularities of more complicated protocols such as TCP. The transmission range for all communication is assumed to be 250m. The number of nodes is 50. During commencement, each node generates a random number: If the number is even, the corresponding node spawns an agent, otherwise, it does not. This indicates that the number of agents is approximately half the number of nodes in the network. The fixed parameters for the simulation are listed in Table 2 . (1) Master key generation time Figure 2 shows the time for master key generation in terms of different network size. When we increase the network size from 10 to 50, the master key generation time is also increased. This observation can be easily explained as the result of more the transmission delay. To get a master key share, each mobile node needs to get message from any of the n-1 node. As we enlarge the network size, the number of transmitted message exploded, which results in a large transmission delay. From this observation, we can also get that the distributed master key generation is not suitable for ad hoc networks with large number of mobile nodes; otherwise the network setup time would be long. One way to address this problem is to initialize a portion of the network nodes, that is, the master private key is first shared by part of the network nodes, and these initialized nodes can be used to initialize other nodes in a (t, n) threshold way. Figure 3 shows the ratio of successful service issuing by varying the value of threshold. Large threshold value requires the node to collect a large number of shares for combining its private key. However, in some situation, the requesting node only has a few neighbors, i.e., it can not get enough number of shares. We count this situation as an unsuccessful service. From Figure 3 , the ratio of successful service decreases as we increase the value of threshold. That means, when we vary the value of threshold from low to high, more and more mobile nodes could not get enough number of neighbors for service. As shown in Figure 3 , the ratio of successful service based on mobile agent is higher about 30%.This is because mobile agents navigate in the MANET network, exchange the private key with the nodes which are not neighbors. In Figure 4 we also give the average service time to a new joining mobile node for different threshold value. We fix the network size to 50 and vary the threshold value from k=4 to k=13. As expected, the average service time for smaller threshold value is shorter, but it grows rapidly as we increase the value of threshold. Thus, choosing an appropriate threshold value for different network size is important in the real network applications. As shown in Figure 4 , the average service time based on mobile agent is shorter 1 second than that of (t,n) threshold.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces a distributed key management method in Ad Hoc network based on mobile agent. Few mobile agents navigate in the network according to a visits-balance policy. Carrying secret key and network topological information, mobile agents communicate with nodes and other agents. When a new node wants to join the Ad Hoc network, t nodes will cooperate with each other to authenticate the new one. The problem with heavy network overload, long service time and low success ratio in traditional distributed authenticate algorithm can be solved in this way. This approach reduces the system overload, and it is very efficient and robust to transmit packets quickly. At mean time, we completely avoid a centralized certification authority or trusted third party to distribute the public keys and the certificates, thus enhance the tolerance of the network to compromised nodes and also efficiently save network bandwidth. As any t nodes can reconstruct the mater private key jointly, whereas it is infeasible for at most t-1 nodes to do so, even by collusion, the security is enhanced. We have done the simulation experiment. The result shows, comparing with the normal (t,n) threshold secret sharing, our method enhances the ratio of successful service and reduces the network overhead.
